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Abstract: The aftermath of the European refugee crisis can be said to have sparked a crisis of soli-
darity. Despite abundant demonstrations of solidarity with refugees and asylum seekers, what
many saw as an exercise of their duty to help was made illegal. The critical term that emerged to
refer to this conjuncture was “criminalization of solidarity”. In order to include this term in the
academic debate, this article starts by disclosing the embedded claims present in its rhetorical
usage. The article then scrutinizes the design of the politics of criminalizing solidarity and its con-
sequences. It argues that at least three aspects of the politics of criminalizing solidarity plausibly
indicate the possibility that regulating the aid in question will produce and reinforce consequences
for the EU that are not only unintended, but also damaging. This is because, first, what I refer to
as the blending aspect might spread the perception of illegality among several types of immi-
grants; second, the moral aspect can discharge people from their duty to help foreigners by condi-
tioning this duty to group membership and belonging; and third, the polarizing aspect might
exacerbate the existing divide between citizens and immigrants currently causing conflicts and
social fragmentation.
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1. Introduction
IN SEPTEMBER 2016, THE human rights activist and well-known writer Lisbeth
Zornig and her husband were convicted of human smuggling for having offered
transport and hospitality a year earlier to a Palestinian-Syrian refugee family in
Denmark. The penalty was raised, after an appeal, to DKK 25,000 for each of
them (Hvilsom, 2016). Like Zornig and her husband, others, such as 70-year-old
Lise Ramslog, were also convicted on the same grounds in Denmark (Nabert
et al., 2019). In February 2017, the olive farmer and activist Cédric Herrou, after
having been detained several times in 2016, was convicted of aiding illegal immi-
grants in France and fined EUR 30,000 (Chrisafis, 2017). After a long battle, the
French Constitutional Council absolved him in July 2018, although Herrou is
constantly under police surveillance (Jacobs and Schechner, 2018). In the same
year Herrou was acquitted, the French mountain guide Benoit Duclois was
charged for assisting a pregnant Nigerian migrant to cross the snowy Italian-
French border on foot. In France, even a former mayor was convicted for offering
accommodation for a Kosovar family and requested to pay a fine in 2018 (Nabert
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et al., 2019). In August 2018, three members of Emergency Response Centre
International (ERCI), a non-governmental organization (NGO), were arrested in
Greece, accused of human smuggling, espionage, money laundering and member-
ship of a criminal organization. Among them was Sara Mardini, a renowned
swimmer and Syrian refugee who, in 2015, together with her sister, swum for
3.5 hours guiding a damaged refugee boat to safety along the coast of Lesbos
near Turkey (Telegraph Reporters, 2018). After spending more than 100 days in
prison, she was released on EUR 5,000 bail (Campana, 2018). More recently, in
2019, the German captain of Sea-Watch 3, Carola Rackete, was arrested for man-
oeuvring the ship carrying 40 migrants into a port in Lampedusa without permis-
sion – 60 hours after having declared a state of emergency (Al Jazeera, 2019a).
She had been accused of assisting human smugglers for having challenged the
right-wing interior minister Matteo Salvini’s “close-ports” policy (Al Jazeera,
2019a). In a video posted on Twitter, Rackete says she expected people to recog-
nize that the international conventions on the safety and rescue at sea supersede
the states’ sovereign rights to control their borders (see 1974 International Con-
vention on the Safety of Life at Sea; 1979 Convention on Maritime Rescue; and
the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea). Rackete was saving people
from otherwise certain death. Although the judge recognized that in court and
released her, she is reported to be currently “in hiding” due to the threats she
received from Salvini’s supporters (Al Jazeera, 2019b).
Hundreds of similar cases have arisen over the last five years (see Nabert et al.,
2019). Religious figures such as pastors and priests (including a priest nominated
for the Nobel Peace Prize), firefighters, lifeguards, local politicians and many vol-
unteers are represented in this list. In the first three months of 2019 alone, almost
80 new cases had been registered (Levoy and Binder, 2019). Although the cases
are spread widely across Europe, it is observed that the number of prosecutions
has risen rapidly within the Member States in which far-right parties have greater
political power and influence (Nabert et al., 2019). The causes of the instauration
of a politics that criminalizes solidarity has indeed been strongly linked to the rise
of far-right ideologies and their increasing power to institutionalize aporophobic
and xeno-racist biases (for an illuminating discussion on the causes of the politics
of criminalization of solidarity, see Fekete, 2018).1
The picture that has been drawn above is not exhaustive, but it should suffice
to illustrate what human rights activists and migration supporters have called the
“criminalization of solidarity”. Generally speaking, the term critically describes
state attempts to prevent non-state actors from acting in direct solidarity with
immigrants requiring assistance through the instrumental use of criminal law and
1 I thank an anonymous reviewer for the reference.
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with the ultimate goal of curtailing the uncontrolled influx of immigrants into EU
territory (e.g., Hayes and Barat, 2017; Buckler, 2018; Phipps, 2018; PICUM,
2018). In other words, the term refers to situations in which types of assistance
normally understood as humanitarian by the EU become, for political reasons,
classified as subversive, insurgent and criminal at the state and supra-state levels
(Wilkins, 2018). Demonstrations of solidarity that became illegal include
assisting certain immigrants to enter, transit or stay in EU territory by facilitating
their access to transport, healthcare, housing, employment and even food and
clothing (see EU Facilitators Package 2002, which includes the Council Direc-
tive, 2002/90/EC and the Framework Decision, 2002/946/JHA). Prescribed penal-
ties vary from state to state, although they are generally quite harsh.
In the Netherlands, for example, certain forms of assistance to someone consid-
ered an “illegal immigrant” can result in either a EUR 81,000 fine or four years
of imprisonment. In France, such assistance can result in a EUR 30,000 fine and
up to five years of imprisonment (see these and the penalties in other countries at
Provera, 2015, pp. 41–43). In Greece, the length of imprisonment can be up to
ten years and the fine can vary from EUR 10,000 to EU 30,000 for every person
assisted (Carrera et al., 2018, p. 33). Aggravating circumstances that include
financial gain and/or membership of an organized group can increase the sanc-
tions considerably. In France, for example, membership of an organized group
assisting certain immigrants can be sanctioned with ten years of imprisonment
and a EUR 750,000 fine. And in Italy, it can result in imprisonment for five to
ten years and a fine of EUR 15,000 for every person involved. If a direct or indi-
rect financial benefit is established, the imprisonment penalty is increased by a
third to a half and the fine is increased to EUR 25,000 for every person involved
(Carrera et al., 2018, p. 35). On 5 August 2019, under Salvini’s government, a
piece of legislation formally criminalizing solidarity by directly targeting NGOs
and people rescuing migrants at sea was approved by the Italian Parliament
(Solidar, 2019).
Although the criminalization of solidarity in the sense of policing or sanction-
ing non-state actors for certain acts of aid is not something entirely new in
Europe, having played an important role in previous attempts to externalize its
borders (del Valle, 2016), this strategy can be said to have acquired a new dimen-
sion when used in response to the so-called European refugee crisis, for two rea-
sons (Agustín and Jorgensen, 2019). First, non-state actors are now coerced to
partake in the creation of hostile environments for asylum seekers and refugees in
order to persuade the latter to return and discourage or prevent others like them
from setting foot in EU territory. Second, the ultimate target-group for this policy
is no longer so-called “economic” immigrants in general, but asylum seekers and
refugees who are, in principle, protected by international human rights and EU
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law. The new dimension added to this strategy of border control has recently
revived academic interest in the topic. To date, most recent academic contribu-
tions are, however, still limited to documenting particular occurrences of the
criminalization of solidarity in different geographical locations and denouncing it
as a problem from different perspectives (Fekete, 2009, 2018; Webber, 2017;
Maccanico et al., 2018; Rozakou, 2018). Less attention has been paid to explor-
ing the possible damaging consequences of the misuse of criminal law as a mere
tool for reducing immigration. Key studies have nevertheless warned that the
criminalization of solidarity can have damaging consequences for power legiti-
macy (Provera, 2015), democracy, rule of law, fundamental rights and social trust
(Carrera et al., 2018; Carrera et al., 2019) and have even pointed to the direct and
indirect effects of this provision on the EU due to its implementation gaps
(Allsopp, 2016; Allsopp and Manieri, 2016). Stipulating that the intended goal of
regulating the aid in question is to reduce illegal immigration, these damaging
consequences to power legitimacy, democracy, rule of law, fundamental rights
and social trust should be seen as unintended ones. How precisely the intended
consequences can lead to unintended and damaging ones is, however, an aspect
that has been neglected in these works.
This article contributes to the recent scholarship on the criminalization of soli-
darity by filling in this gap from the perspective of moral and legal philosophy. It
asks the question: how can the politics of criminalization of solidarity disarray
from the intended to unintended and even damaging consequences for the EU? It
advances a consequentialist argument and argues that determined aspects of this
regulation of aid can indicate the possibility of such disarray occurring. Due to
space and focus constraints, I do not question whether the intended consequences
of the politics of criminalizing solidarity are moral or not, even if I have reasons
to think that they can be damaging enough on their own (for this, see Landry,
2016; Costelo, 2018). This means that I will not discuss here whether the states’
right to exclude immigrants is morally justifiable. States do have this right to
exclude as a matter of fact, which I take for granted in this article. My goal here
is rather to expose the possibility that the misuse of criminal law as an instrument
for border control backfires against the EU’s own objective of creating an area of
freedom, security and justice within its territory. This is the case mainly because
the politics of criminalizing solidarity has the capacity to corrupt the sense of sol-
idarity that is meant to underpin the coexistence of our plural and diverse socie-
ties within the EU.
“Solidarity” is certainly a very fluid concept, used to describe a variety of atti-
tudes and actions. This concept has, furthermore, certainly suffered many trans-
formations over time (Stjernø, 2005). Using the concept in one sense does not
necessarily corrupt the other senses. The sense of solidarity underpinning the
© 2019 The Author. Theoria published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Stifielsen Theoria
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coexistence of plural and diverse societies in the EU, however, is a sense of soli-
darity captured by what has been described as a “vision of sociality” that tran-
scends national citizenship (Heath, 2016; Rakopoulos, 2016). It is argued that
this vision, which in times of crisis and austerity emerges as a “vision of shared
human struggle”, has the capacity to bridge the differences among people through
empathetic understandings and symmetrical material and non-material exchanges.
Solidarity, in this sense, is not grounded on one’s relationship to a state, but on
one’s commitment to secure human sociality even when the state fails in provid-
ing its conditions. It is then precisely this sense of solidarity that is put under
pressure when states illegitimately use their power to rule over a sphere that
should be out of their scope.
The article has five parts. Section 2 starts by disentangling the term “criminali-
zation of solidarity”, separating its rhetorical usage from its analytical one.
Section 3 argues that at least three aspects of the politics of criminalizing solidar-
ity indicate the possibility of disarray from intended to unintended and damaging
consequences for the EU. Section 4 considers some objections, and section 5
concludes.
2. Criminalizing Solidarity: Disentangling the Rhetorical and Analytical
Usage of the Term
The term “criminalizing solidarity” certainly has a strong rhetorical appeal. From
an analytical point of view, however, it lacks precision. In order to secure a more
solid conceptual basis for further debate on the topic, this section clarifies the
meaning of the term by disentangling claims associated with it. The term “crimi-
nalization of solidarity” professes a radical criticism of the states’ regulation of
certain acts of aid and builds on the notion’s fluidity in expanding its coverage. In
its formulation, the term conveys at least two claims that need to be elucidated.
First, we could think that given that, in a certain sense, the idea of solidarity
seems to be associated with an elevated disposition that tends to express what is
morally right, the formulation of the term “criminalization of solidarity” appears
to rely on an intuition that criminalizing it must therefore be morally wrong. The
sense that I have in mind is based on an interpretation of the concept of solidarity
that originally has a link to religion and that consists in affirming that a moral
duty commands us to be solidary with others. By referring to this sense, I do not
intend to claim that the religious interpretation of the concept is the main or the
most ordinary one, but only to consider that, despite the secularization of Europe,
supported by Reale (2005), this view of solidarity seems to remain in the back-
ground of our basic intuitions about the concept. This idea is well captured by
Lisbeth Zornig when she says the following about her and her husband’s
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conviction: “I was angry…angry about being criminalized for acting with simple
human decency…My husband and I could not have acted differently. It would
have been a betrayal of everything we hold dear and believe in, including what
we teach our children” (McMahon, 2017, p. 29).
Even if, analytically speaking, solidarity is actually a morally neutral term in
the sense that there can be occurrences of expressions of solidarity that could be
criminalized without them being morally wrong (e.g., helping a justly convicted
criminal to evade justice), the term builds upon the claim that the solidarity being
criminalized is, for all the effects, a moral kind of solidarity that should not be
criminalized (see section 2.1). What supports this claim seems to be an under-
standing of solidarity as “a vision of human sociality” that ultimately transcends
citizenship or particular group belonging. That means an understanding of soli-
darity that links human beings with each other based on an idea of human dig-
nity, of “human decency” as Zornig describes it, and emerges even when the state
fails in providing the conditions for its realization. The idea of solidarity that is
denoted in this context refers then to a kind of solidarity that should not be crimi-
nalized because the state has no legitimate power to interfere in this realm and
rule on when and how people could (or could not) be solidary with each other.
This is especially problematic when the role of criminal law stops being to protect
society against deviant behaviour, and becomes a tool to force people to accept a
situation in which they must advance a specific political agenda with which they
do not even agree.
Second, regarding the fluidity of the idea of solidarity in itself, solidarity can
indeed be understood and expressed in many different ways. As the examples
above show, not all acts of solidarity are being criminalized – but only some by
determined agents and directed to a determined group of people in need. In a sim-
plified scheme, solidarity can be understood and expressed in terms of positive
attitudes or in terms of supportive action. Solidary attitudes are positive mental dis-
positions that people have towards others based on, for example, sympathetic feel-
ings towards refugees and asylum seekers, a desire to assist them, a belief that they
ought to be assisted or even the knowledge of their human rights. Solidary actions
are the supportive deeds performed by some people in favour of others by, for
example, offering food, clothing, transport or advice to asylum seekers and refu-
gees, demonstrating in favour of their cause, or even writing in support of their
rights. Whereas the examples cited above illustrate the criminalization of solidarity
only in terms of penalizing acts when it comes to aiding certain immigrants in
entering, transiting or residing in EU territory, the term suggests that criminalizing
acts of solidarity can have an overall impact on solidary attitudes as well (see
section 2.2).
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2.1 Criminalization of humanitarian assistance
Disagreement with the first claim – that is, with the one that assumes that the
kind of acts of assistance that are being criminalized should not be criminalized –
operates by seeking to make the usage of this term appear nonsensical. In the text
of the Facilitators Package there is no direct mention of the word “solidarity” as
such. Other important documents that exploit the Facilitators Package in connec-
tion to the European Refugee Crisis, such as the EU Action Plan against migrant
smuggling (COM(2015)285 final) and the Council conclusions on migrant smug-
gling ((2016)6995/16), do not mention the word “solidarity” either. Solidarity is,
however, implicated in these documents, raising a source of critique for con-
structing the term in two senses:
(1) First, a sense of solidarity is implicated in terms of “humanitarian assis-
tance”. “Humanitarian assistance” is mentioned in the Facilitation Direc-
tive in order to convey the idea that Member States have the option not to
sanction acts of assistance to non-nationals seeking to enter or transit
across the state’s territory when these acts are motivated by humanitarian
aims (Council Directive, 2002/90EC art. 1:2). However, to give to Mem-
ber States the option not to penalize humanitarian assistance means also
that they have the option to penalize it. The term “criminalization of soli-
darity” then incorporates this critique against the optional penalization of
humanitarian assistance.
(2) Second, these documents, taken together, mark the idea of criminalizing
the facilitation of illegal immigration and human smuggling as a priority
for the European Agenda on Migration (COM (2015)240 final, Brussels,
13 May) and for the European Agenda on Security (COM (2015)185
final, Strasbourg, 28 April). In a sense, it is the facilitation of illegal
immigration and human smuggling that are being criminalized, not soli-
darity. Given the more common negative connotation of the terms “illegal
immigration” and “human smuggling”, it does not seem so controversial
to say that these are acts that should be criminalized (see Hidalgo, 2018,
and Landry, 2016 for a different perspective on human smuggling). But
the point of critique is that these documents conflate the facilitation of
illegal immigration and human smuggling with solidarity and blend “ille-
gal” immigrants with asylum seekers and refugees.
This means that the term “criminalization of solidarity” embeds a critique
against (1) the optional penalization of humanitarian assistance and against
(2) the conflation of humanitarian assistance and the facilitation of illegal immi-
gration and human smuggling.
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2.2 Discredit of solidary attitudes
Disagreeing with the second claim – that is, the one that assumes that criminaliz-
ing acts of solidarity can have an overall impact on the solidary attitudes as well
– shows disregard for the broader effects that a prohibitive law can have. As a
result, it limits the recognition of possible damaging consequences when it comes
to the politics of criminalizing solidarity for our societies. A prohibitive law, how-
ever, can have either direct or indirect ambitions:
(1) One reason why certain actions are criminalized in a society is to discour-
age or prevent these actions from happening as a matter of practice. This
is the case when the ambition behind the law is direct: that is, when crimi-
nalizing certain acts intends to change how people act in relation to the
specific regulation. In Norway, for example, it is prohibited for individuals
to import potatoes without special authorization from the state. This regu-
lation is not intended to make potatoes inaccessible to the Norwegian peo-
ple or to make them dislike potatoes. It is just intended to prevent
individuals from importing potatoes for reasons that are not associated
with any inherent attribute of potatoes, such as protecting local farmers.
(2) Another reason why certain acts are criminalized in a society, perhaps
more meaningful from an ethical perspective, is to prevent these actions
from becoming a practice that is associated with what is morally, and not
only legally, right. This is the case when the ambition behind the law is
indirect: that is, criminalization of certain acts is intended to change the
morality underlying peoples’ attitudes towards something. Through the
discouragement of certain acts, attitudes that would otherwise support
such acts are also discredited. An example of this is the ban on smoking
in public places. When it was first introduced, many people complained
that their individual freedom was being impaired by the state. Today,
however, there is a clear understanding that this policy is in accordance
with the public’s health interests. The idea is that the criminalization of
certain acts first affects people’s behaviour and then, with time, alters peo-
ple’s moral attitudes as well.
Sometimes changes in attitudes are desirable and contribute to making society
a better place, as in the above example of the smoking ban. Laws and regulations
intended to prevent sexual harassment and discrimination in the workplace are
other examples that show the criminalization of certain acts can have a desirable
effect in changing people’s attitudes as well. Sometimes, however, these changes
in attitudes can go wrong, have unintended effects, or even damage the structure
of the society (Bilz and Nadler, 2014). Since the criminalization of solidarity
requires some people to act against their moral judgement, it is difficult to defend
© 2019 The Author. Theoria published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Stifielsen Theoria
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the idea that this policy will impact only on people’s actions and not their atti-
tudes as well. It becomes then important to know whether attitude changes pro-
voked and (cyclically) reinforced by the politics of criminalizing solidarity
remain within the scope of the intended effects, or whether they can produce
unintended and perhaps even damaging effects for society as a whole.
This means that the term “criminalizing solidarity” embraces a broad notion of
solidarity that incorporates not only (1) a critique against the reduction of the
denoted prohibitive law to its direct ambitions, but also (2) against the predict-
ability of its indirect ambition in provoking attitude changes that will remain only
within the scope of the intended consequences.
In summary, criminalizing humanitarian assistance (section 2.1) and its impacts
on the underlying morality of the people (section 2.2) restricts solidarity, poten-
tially affecting both the bottom-up motivation for the emergence of a duty to help
in general and the top-down justification for compelling people to act in a sup-
portive way towards needy human beings that do not clearly belong to their inner
group. In order to aggregate these embedded claims in the term more clearly, I
will be referring more broadly to the politics of criminalizing solidarity.
3. “You Should Have Seen That Coming!”
The EU has a stated objective of creating an area of freedom, security and justice
within its territory. According to the Council Directive (2002/90EC, Preamble
1 and 2), combating the aid of illegal immigration is one of the ways to promote
the creation of such an area. Therefore, the Council Directive focuses on strength-
ening the penal framework against the facilitation of illegal immigration. From
this perspective, what has been called the politics of criminalizing solidarity has
been designed to make illegal immigration more difficult, with the greater goal of
strengthening freedom, security and justice within EU territory. With this in
mind, we might expect that if the politics of criminalizing solidarity succeeds in
combating the facilitation of illegal immigration, it would then help achieve this
greater goal. On the other hand, if the politics of criminalizing solidarity fails to
combat the facilitation of illegal immigration, it would then fail to promote this
greater goal.
However, the mode by which the facilitation of illegal immigration is combated
matters – and matters largely for the achievement of such a greater goal. By, for
example, shooting down every person attempting to cross the border, illegal
immigration would be erased, but with it the EU would cease to be an area of
freedom, security and justice. An inadequate mode of combating illegal immigra-
tion can actually twist the expected relational outcome of a regulation, such that
the failure to combat illegal immigration would actually contribute more to
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achieving the greater goal than its success. Assuming that power legitimacy,
democracy, rule of law, fundamental rights and social trust are essential elements
of an area of freedom, security and justice, any law or policy set in motion by the
EU that goes against these elements would be damaging in terms of establishing
such an area in the EU. Going against these elements need not be within the
intended effects of a law or policy. It suffices that significant adversities to these
elements are among the unintended effects of a law or policy to produce damages
for the creation of such an area of freedom, security and justice.
In light of this, this section aims to increase awareness of the possibility that a
prohibitive regulation such as that put forward by the politics of criminalizing sol-
idarity will produce unintended and damaging effects on the EU. This
section shows that even if the politics of criminalizing solidarity achieves the goal
of reducing the facilitation of illegal immigration (a matter yet to be settled
empirically), it might fail to contribute to the creation of an area of freedom,
security and justice within the EU territory because of its negative effects on
power legitimacy, democracy, rule of law, fundamental rights and social trust in
general. Instead of exposing how the politics of criminalizing solidarity impacts
negatively on each of these elements individually, this section focuses on disclos-
ing the negative impacts from some aspects related to the form and content of this
specific prohibition of aid. I argue that at least three aspects of this prohibitive
law provide for the possibility that the politics of criminalizing solidarity will
negatively affect people’s attitudes towards foreigners in general and produce
unintended and damaging consequences for the EU.
The three aspects of this prohibitive law are the following: (a) it coerces people
to abide by a law criminalizing the facilitation of illegal immigration when the
distinctions between “legal” and “illegal” immigrants and between solidarity and
human smuggling are not clear for them (the blending aspect); (b) it coerces
some people to act against what they see as the fulfilment of their duty to help
(the moral aspect); and (c) it is implemented in times of increasing dissensus
about our duties to foreigners (the polarizing aspect).
3.1 The blending aspect
We saw above that the aim of the Facilitators Package and further related docu-
ments is, literally, to combat illegal immigration. As illegal immigrants, asylum
seekers, refugees, and legal (newcomers or settled) immigrants belong to different
legal categories of immigrants, these documents should only be targeting the ille-
gal ones. An illegal immigrant is defined, according to the Council Directive, as a
person who is not a national of a Member State that enters, transits across or
resides within the territory in breach of its laws concerning the entry, transit and
residence of aliens. A facilitator of illegal immigration is there defined as any
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person who intentionally assists an illegal immigrant in entering or transiting
across the territory of a Member State. It also includes those who, for financial
reasons, intentionally help an illegal immigrant to reside within the territory of a
Member State. This applies both when this assistance is connected with the
“unauthorised crossing of the border” and when it is done for the purpose of
“sustaining networks which exploit human beings” (Council Directive, 2002/90/
EC, art. 1(a)(b) and Preamble 3). In order for the Facilitators Package and related
documents to affect de facto only the illegal immigrants, the facilitators – that is,
those assisting immigrants to enter, transit across or reside or stay in EU territory
– should be able to distinguish illegal immigrants from the others. The definition
provided by the Facilitation Directive should provide the tools to enable people to
make this distinction.
Even though international human rights norms and EU directives do not crimi-
nalize the activity of seeking asylum per se (see UN General Assembly, 1951,
FRA, art. 18, CEAS, ECHR), and even though these norms and directives from
above compel Member States to refrain from criminalizing such activity, asylum
seekers and refugees, as well as those acting in solidarity with them, are directly
affected by criminal laws targeting instances of so-called “illegal” immigration.
Human rights spell out the duties that states have towards asylum seekers and ref-
ugees, but they do not exactly challenge the sovereign right of states to control
their borders. Claiming compatibility with human rights norms, the EU finds jus-
tification for affirming a distinction between “legal” and “illegal” immigrants
(one of the Common European Asylum System’s (CEAS) main tasks) and for
incentivizing Member States to criminalize what they call “illegal” immigration
and those who support it (Richey, 2013).
Compatibility between international human rights and EU directives in relation
to Member States’ regulations is certainly highly questionable – especially after
taking into account the observed effects that these regulations produce in alienat-
ing human beings from some of their most basic rights. The criteria used to clas-
sify persons as asylum seekers, refugees or “illegal” immigrants are not always
easy to identify in practice and especially not in critical circumstances. Before
delivering help to an immigrant, one might need to first be able to identify
whether the recipient is “legal” or “illegal” in order to avoid the risk of being
criminally charged. The outcome is, more often than not, uncertain.
In addition, it does not take much for someone with asylum seeker or refugee
status to acquire an illegal status. Breaching one of the numerous administrative
policies imposed on newcomers might already be enough to produce this effect
(Anderson, 2013). Asylum seekers who use any other entry point than those
determined by the state, or lack the appropriate papers to document their identity
and status, already run the risk of being deemed illegal. Escaping from a
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detention centre or leaving a refugee camp without permission can also easily
become a source of illegality – even though these places are repeatedly reported
for constantly violating the human rights of immigrants (Parekh, 2016). Over-
staying in a country after being refused refugee status or humanitarian protection,
due to a legal mismatch between the cause of displacement and what is strictly
outlined in the current norms and laws, also deems them illegal despite the real,
life-threatening risks of returning home. This is, for example, the case for many
Afghan asylum seekers who have been systematically denied refugee status since
2015 despite being victims of extreme violence in their home country (AIDA,
2017). As much as 72% of rejected applicants sent back to Afghanistan have had
to flee again (Samuel Hall/NRC/IDMC, 2018).
This shows that the distinction between a “legal” and an “illegal” immigrant in
practice is much more complex than the theoretical definition can actually cover.
From the perspective of a possible agent of solidarity, this complexity creates an
atmosphere of confusion in which it can become quite difficult to know for sure
whether one is helping an asylum seeker, a refugee or a “illegal” immigrant. To
avoid the risk of being charged and facing harsh penalties, the safest course of
action might be to avoid helping entirely. In this sense, the politics of criminalizing
solidarity produces the immediate effect of reducing their impetus to help such peo-
ple. The simple fear of suffering a penalty might coerce many into not delivering
help in the same way that the simple fear of punishment might coerce many not to
commit a crime. In fact, regarding humanitarian organizations, there is already
plenty of evidence linking the politics of criminalizing solidarity with a decline in
humanitarian interventions, especially regarding activity at the sea (e.g., Serrano-
Conde, 2019; McMahon, 2017, p. 36). First, investigations and prosecutions have
prevented these organizations from acting in the field by blocking search and rescue
boats under the suspicion that they are engaged with criminal associations that
facilitate illegal immigration. Second, prosecutions have forced organizations to
redirect the focus of their work from assisting people to defending themselves.
Third, the association of humanitarian organizations with potential criminal activity
has already affected their funds due to the reduced number of donations.
From the point of view of a possible recipient of solidarity, the sense of confu-
sion is no less pronounced. First, their presence is quasi-criminal, according to
administrative law; second, solidarity on the part of those people who wish to
help them has been legally criminalized. Social networks have always been an
important source of orientation for immigrants (Blumenstock et al., 2019). It is
through social networks that they find the support they need to claim their rights,
especially when states have failed to recognize them and provide for them. The
politics of criminalizing solidarity imposes serious limitations on what people can
do in such social networks. Without the mediating role that social networks
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provide in terms of guidance and help, asylum seekers and refugees find them-
selves alone against a state that, in many cases, repudiates them. Social isolation
leads to legal isolation, which is how states make it even more difficult for them
to access their basic rights. The stage for a hostile environment is set and the con-
ditions for assistance are obliterated. Alienated from their basic rights, coming to
or remaining in the EU offers them little improvement on their previous condi-
tion. The intended outcome appears to be to prevent them from coming, as well
as pressuring those who are already in the EU to leave its territory. Moreover, it
is precisely because the rights of asylum seekers and refugees are recognized, as
stated in the human rights framework, that the criminalization of solidarity with
them emerges. One cannot send them back to the place they are fleeing from
(because of their right to non-refoulement), but instead one can create conditions
that will first constrain their arrival and then pressure those who manage to cross
the borders to move away “voluntarily”.
This means that if the combatting of illegal immigration is to be carried out in
accordance with human rights, as claimed, the job of controlling illegal immigra-
tion (if applicable) should be left to authorities that are able to make a distinction
between “legal” and “illegal” immigrants and not imposed on citizens who will, in
practice, struggle to verify their status accurately, given the complexity of the legal
framework regulating the rights of aliens. If individuals are penalized for helping
illegal immigrants when they are unable to distinguish illegal immigrants from ref-
ugees, asylum seekers, or even from legal (newcomers or settled) immigrants, the
politics of criminalizing solidarity first discourages acts of solidarity with immi-
grants in general (even with those that are, in principle, protected by international
law and entitled to protection) and, second, discredits solidary attitudes towards
these immigrants as a block. The blending effect might cause the erosion of the dif-
ferent categories of immigrants, as they all wrongly inherit the negative status of
perceived illegality and the attribute of being undeserving. Considering all this, it
is likely that, if the politics of criminalizing solidarity works, it will not only
reduce illegal immigration, but also reduce immigration in general, including the
number of already settled immigrants in the EU. While this, though unstated, can
be a desirable effect from the point of view of those advancing and supporting the
criminalization of solidarity, it is worth noting that the costs of non-immigration
might be higher to Europe than the costs of immigration, when we take into
account the dependence of several sectors on migrant labour such as health and
elderly care, industry, agriculture and construction, among others (EESC, 2018).
3.2 The moral aspect
Many of us would agree that assisting someone in need when one is capable of
doing so is the morally right thing to do. Need for assistance and capacity to
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assist are, however, not the only things normally taken into consideration when
making such a judgement. In many cases, the person in need must be seen as
someone deserving the assistance, and the person assisting must see themselves
as being the right one to deliver this assistance. In some cases, this sense of a
duty to help in terms of alleviating a critical need manifests in the shape of char-
ity or humanitarian help. One may, for example, feel obliged or pleased to give a
coin or two to a starving mother sitting next to the supermarket door or donate
some money to a humanitarian organization, or feel a certain guilt for not doing
so. In other cases, this sense becomes a duty that is manifested in terms of legal
obligations or social norms. One can, for example, be charged for refusing to pay
taxes that will, among other things, support a redistribution system intended, at
least partially if not primarily, to provide critical assistance to those in need. In
some countries, a person can even be charged for refusing to help someone at the
scene of a traffic accident (e.g., Criminal Codes of Spain, articles 195–196;
Bekendtgørelse af straffeloven, 2015; Denmark, §253; Justicia, 2019;
Strafgesetzbuch (StGB) §323c Unterlassene Hilfeleistung; and Germany,
section 323(c)).
The absence of legislation on such a duty to help is nevertheless usually filled
by social norms. In Sweden, for instance, not being legally penalized for refusing
to help someone in a traffic accident does not seem to make people feel less com-
pelled to do so (von Hirsch, 2011). Legislation, in that case, is aligned with
shared moral values and works more as an insurance against moral deviations,
even if it tends not to be the sole driver of people’s actions. Many of us, for
example, would refrain from stealing not because of the risk of being sent to jail,
though this might be an additional reason, but because, in normal circumstances,
we see something fundamentally wrong with taking possession of something that
belongs to another person without a previous agreement or contract. This basic
harmony or connection between law and morality certainly does not make the law
necessarily good or just, but it shows that a set of laws tends to, in some way,
mirror the dominant moral values of a society (see Raz, 2003, which sheds light
on the relationship between morality and law). This basic harmony or connection
between law and morality facilitates compliance.
This means that when a law contradicts, rather than reinforces, this sense of a
duty to help, its success in terms of achieving peaceful compliance and
accomplishing the goal for which it is designed depends on reframing people’s
underlying moral attitudes. The success of the politics of criminalizing solidarity
in combating illegal immigration would then depend on reframing certain acts of
humanitarian assistance as a crime and on discrediting the recipients of this assis-
tance as “undeserving”. The blending effect, as we saw, would make virtually
every immigrant a potentially illegal and thus “undeserving” one. From this
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perspective, the politics of criminalizing solidarity would not only have to dis-
courage people and institutions from acting in accordance with what they see as
their duty to help, but also to discredit solidary attitudes with immigrants from
becoming associated with the fulfilment of this duty in itself. In this sense, the
criminalization of solidarity would teach people that, for example, helping asylum
seekers and refugees without the mediation of the state is no longer the morally
right thing do to. A need for help and self-assessed capacity for helping would no
longer suffice when it comes to determining the moral status of an action of criti-
cal aid. The state takes up the role of establishing the terms of the action by
deciding, first, whether these immigrants are owed the assistance, and second,
how and from whom they should receive it. In other words, the politics of crimi-
nalizing solidarity ultimately constrains the possibility of refugees and asylum
seekers (and also other immigrants) from being objects of solidarity on the part
of non-state actors.
The moral aspect, in this sense, serves somehow to corrupt and discharge peo-
ple from what they would otherwise see as their moral duty to help immigrants in
need. Considering this, if the criminalization of solidarity succeeds in curtailing
(illegal) immigration, the moral intuition behind the emergence of a duty to help
and its demands would be totally twisted and would affect the meaning of solidar-
ity in a limiting way: solidarity with those in need would then risk becoming con-
ditional on group belonging. This means that a duty to help would possibly only
have space to emerge among fellows; that is, in a context in which group mem-
bership pre-establishes whether the person in need is seen as someone deserving
the assistance and whether the person delivering the assistance is seen as the right
one to do so.
3.3 The polarizing aspect
The polarizing aspect emerges when the politics of criminalizing solidarity is
implemented in times of increasing dissensus about our duties to foreigners.
While in the aftermath of what became known as the European refugee crisis
there were abundant demonstrations of solidarity with refugees and asylum
seekers from EU citizens and organizations, there was also increasing hostility
towards them. While some people are disposed to help foreigners in need – refu-
gees and asylum seekers in particular – others have little or no interest in under-
taking supportive actions to help them. This means that people’s intuitions vary
when it comes to the moral status of solidarity not just with illegal immigrants,
but even with refugees and asylum seekers.
Usually the most paradigmatic cases of moral solidarity involve children. Who
would be able to say that preventing a child from drowning in a shallow pond does
not outweigh the costs of getting one’s clothes muddy and wet? (Singer, 1997).
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The picture of the three-year-old Syrian boy, Alan Kurdî, lying dead on the beach
near Bodrum, Turkey, shocked the world and was described as a “human catastro-
phe” (Tharoor, 2015). Children are the kind of innocent and helpless beings that
have the appeal to make most people agree that, no matter what, they deserve noth-
ing else than our care. At the other end of the spectrum are criminals of the most
serious kind, such as mass murders and terrorists. If any people are unworthy of
our solidarity, it is them. This is because they represent the kind of vicious figures
that have not only disregarded the law, but have also purposely harmed others.
True, they might end up being objects of our pity if we think of them as mentally
ill or psychologically disturbed, but at least I would not expect a charitable founda-
tion for the well-being of mass murders and terrorists to raise the same amount of
funds as UNICEF, for example. But even criminals of the worst kind can be the
object of one’s solidarity in different ways. Those defending their rights to a fair
trial, respect for their human rights, and for a punishment that does not exceed the
sentence, show solidarity with them – a moral kind of solidarity. Helping such
criminals evade justice, on the other hand, exemplifies an immoral kind of solidar-
ity if one acknowledges that this is assisting a wrongdoer in getting away with their
crimes. While the moral kind of solidarity is not supposed to be criminalized, the
immoral kind is.
As clear as the poles of the spectrum might look, in practice a large grey zone
separates them. Activism and social movements, for example, may operate within
this zone where the moral and immoral kinds of solidarity and the corresponding
inferences about its criminalization are somehow blurred in the big picture. Soli-
darity with some might sometimes harm or allegedly harm others, which makes it
even more difficult to establish its moral standing clearly among divergent groups
of people. Solidarity with refugees and asylum seekers seems to be gaining space
within this zone of diffusion. This is because the way refugees and asylum
seekers are represented varies considerably, generating different intuitions of
whether solidarity is owed to them or not in a moral sense. Some might say that
refugees and asylum seekers deserve as much protection as citizens in virtue of
our common humanity (cosmopolitans). Others might say that while citizens have
priority in the distribution of resources, they are still entitled to some kind of
immediate assistance in virtue of their critical vulnerabilities (statists). And others
might even brand asylum seekers and refugees as “undeserving” by attributing to
them a role in causing the collapse of their own home country and in producing
their own need to flee. It should be noted that the latter view is not in accordance
with international law, which grants to refugees and asylum seekers the right to
seek asylum – providing a reason not to consider this view and rather prioritize
any of the others.
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The map of differences in people’s attitudes towards immigrants or refugees
and asylum seekers is not new. We know that such deep disagreements exist and
that any attempt to legislate on the issue will tend to be controversial. Abortion
laws are another example of regulations built over great dissensus related to the
underlying moral values of the people. The controversy in itself is inevitable in
such cases. The point is that by legislating on it, the state has a choice to point to
the side it will endorse. In order for the politics of criminalizing solidarity to
work in reducing (illegal) immigration, the state will have to give voice to a dif-
ferent narrative of solidarity that contradicts the narrative of the “facilitators”, and
would consider them wrongdoers. The narrative in question comes in the form of
identitarian politics that, for example, overvalues the protection of their own peo-
ple and repudiates immigrants: it is the well-known “us” against “them” dis-
course. This narrative would have to reaffirm that Zornig, Herrou and Rackete
are traitors for putting their own people at risk when helping foreigners to enter,
transit across or stay in the EU. The distance between the divergent groups can
grow and lead to an increase in violent irruptions. Communication between and
across such fragmented groups would be impaired by the fundamentalism of their
views, as the conditions for alliances become compromised. The polarizing aspect
would then exacerbate the existing divide between citizens and immigrants within
the territory of the EU and jeopardize earlier integration efforts.
In summary, this section has shown that the blending, moral and polarizing
aspects of the politics of criminalizing solidarity in the EU can plausibly produce
and reinforce unintended and damaging consequences for the EU. This is because
(a) the blending aspect might spread the perception of illegality among several
types of immigrants; (b) the moral aspect can discharge people from their duty to
help foreigners by predicating this duty on group membership and belonging;
and (c) the polarizing aspect might exacerbate the existing divide between citi-
zens and immigrants that is currently causing conflict and social fragmentation.
4. Objections
Many objections can be raised against the argument developed in this article.
Some of them challenge the specific aspects of the politics of criminalizing soli-
darity as discussed above, while others could question the predictive strength of
the argument as a whole. Examples of specific criticisms could be (4.1) the prob-
lem of the blending aspect is circumstantial and can be counteracted with better
tools for distinguishing between “legal” and “illegal” immigrants; (4.2) the prob-
lem of the moral aspect overlooks the possibility that weakening solidarity with
foreigners can actually strengthen solidarity with co-members and even enable
the enlargement of the group of co-members; and (4.3) the problem with the
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polarizing aspect treats dissensus as a source of social fragmentation that should
be avoided, instead of embraced it as a sign of acceptance of a plurality of views.
I will take these objections seriously and briefly respond to each of them, before
exposing the general objection to the argument as a whole.
4.1 Objection to the blending aspect
In principle, better tools for distinguishing between “legal” and “illegal” migrants
in practice would certainly help to restrict the politics of criminalizing solidarity
to its intended goal of reducing the facilitation of illegal and only illegal immi-
gration. For this to happen, the definition of illegal immigrants provided by the
authorities would not only have to be capable of clarifying the meaning of “illegal
immigration” in theoretical terms, but also, more importantly, make this theoreti-
cal definition somehow useful for enabling the identification of illegal immigrants
in a variety of real-world circumstances. There would, of course, never be a per-
fect match between theory and practice, but in order to attempt to decrease the
distance, the theoretical definition would have to be either meticulously compli-
cated or dangerously oversimplified. Is a child brought to the EU illegally an ille-
gal immigrant? Is an asylum seeker who is not yet able to apply for asylum, due
to the limitations of a state’s capacity, an illegal immigrant? Is any undocumented
person an illegal immigrant? Recalling that the politics of the criminalization of
solidarity relies on ordinary citizens mastering these distinctions, a meticulous
definition would perhaps not be so different from expecting them to master a
large number of laws regulating the rights and duties of aliens. Lack of knowl-
edge would in any case lead to the blending effect, as would an oversimplified
definition.
4.2 Objection to the moral aspect
The moral aspect indicated the possibility that the politics of criminalizing soli-
darity would end up discharging people from moral obligations to help outsiders.
This can produce an unintended negative effect concerning solidarity among EU
citizens, since the citizens of different Member States are, in a sense, outsiders to
each other. But it could also be the case that, as the objection claims, limiting sol-
idarity with EU outsiders would increase solidarity among EU members. As one
of the EU’s main objectives is the creation of an area of freedom, security and
justice for itself and not the entire world, this effect could even be desirable.
These two possible effects, the negative and, say, the “positive”, are, however, not
exclusive. Both can happen at the same time at different levels up to a point
where one prevails over the other. While the EU is a community with its own
members, it is a community of a special kind. EU integration relies on deepening
and strengthening solidarity across Member States and among the citizens of each
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of these Member States, while preserving diversity of culture and of national
identities and respecting the public authority of the Member States’ institutions at
all levels (Bonde, 2009). This means that the creation of an area of freedom,
security and justice within the EU territory as a whole depends on its capacity
harmoniously to create cohesion in light of its diversity. In honouring these multi-
ple commitments, EU citizenship is not supposed to erase national citizenships
and other forms of identity, but to respect, protect and even promote them. This
means that the link sustaining peoples under this label of European citizenship
depends, in a sense, on a link of solidarity with “foreigners” as well. Even if
these “foreigners” are, in a sense, “less” foreign than someone from outside the
EU, they are still non-members of the state community where the ties are suppos-
edly stronger. The politics of criminalizing solidarity with immigrants therefore
has the potential to become a symbol of the EU’s failure to cultivate cohesion
based on diversity.
Furthermore, the problem lies in the moral twist in itself, and whether this twist
will cause negative or positive, unintended or intended, consequences. While we
can largely disagree about the extent to which we have a moral duty to help for-
eigners, it should still be considered morally wrong to deny help in a situation of
critical need. Helping refugees and asylum seekers to escape and giving them a
chance to rebuild their lives is the minimum standard for a moral duty to help.
Ignoring this must entail a loss of humanity and civility.
4.3 Objection to the polarizing aspect
I agree that dissensus, in general, can either be a source of conflict and social frag-
mentation that should be avoided or, as stated by the objection, a sign of the accep-
tance of a plurality of views that should be embraced. If the latter were also a
possibility in this case, the polarizing aspect of the politics of criminalizing soli-
darity as described above would, according to the objection, perhaps not be a
strong indicator of the possibility of this regulation of aid producing damaging
consequences for the EU. However, while dissensus can cause social fragmenta-
tion, it cannot cause a plurality of views, but can instead only be a sign of its
embracement. This means that promoting a plurality of views should be achieved
by other means than by embracing dissensus in itself. For example, suppose we
have three divergent groups in a society: group 1 believes “A” to be correct; group
2 believes “B” to be correct; and group 3 is indifferent. Whether, however, the co-
existence of these divergences of views among the three groups would be a sign of
acceptance of a plurality of views depends primarily on the way the discussants
see and interact with each other. If, for instance, they respect each other as discus-
sants (which does not require them to arrive at a final consensus), this would be a
positive sign of the acceptance of a plurality of views in a society. If, however, they
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disregard each other and, for instance, reject the competing positions perhaps sim-
ply because they are held by “others”, then rather than being a sign of acceptance
of a plurality of views, dissensus is a sign of its rejection.
The politics of criminalizing solidarity, as we know well by now, aims at
preventing non-state actors from acting in a certain way. It makes use of criminal
law to impose a prohibition and restrict people’s actions. Within the context of
the illustration above, it is a situation in which disagreement at the policy level
makes group 1, which believes in “A”, not only disagree with groups 2 and
3, but also impose on groups 2 and 3 the obligation to act according to “A”. As
such, it seems that the dissensus employed by the politics of criminalizing soli-
darity cannot possibly be a sign of acceptance of a plurality of views in a society,
but only of its rejection. In fact, it even seems to consist in an attempt to erase
any plurality of views, which, in a situation in which the disagreements remain,
could only lead to social fragmentation.
4.4 General objection
The final objection that I want to discuss here is the one I labelled “general”, for it
attacks the predictive force of the argument as a whole. According to this objec-
tion, it is a weakness of this argument that it artificially singles out the politics of
criminalizing solidarity from a large and robust body of laws and complex con-
juncture. Thus, even if it turns out to be the case that the politics of criminalizing
solidarity produces and reinforces unintended and damaging consequences for the
EU, as the argument advanced in this article has indicated, other laws, regulations
and policies set in motion by the EU could compensate and correct for these nega-
tive effects. In this sense, the predictive force of the argument would be limited by
its failure to take into account other relevant factors in determining whether the
negative impact of the politics of criminalizing solidarity would be significant for
the EU project overall.
Here, I am willing to accept that the argument could be said, in this sense, to
be limited, but not that this limitation affects the plausibility of its conclusion in
a negative way – for two reasons. First, it was never the goal of this article to
draw up a comprehensive picture, infer likelihood, and conclude with a straight-
forward prescriptive approach. The goal was rather to draw attention to the possi-
bility that the politics of criminalizing solidarity might produce and reinforce
unintended consequences and that, given its design, some of the unintended con-
sequences might even be damaging for the EU. Second, this article does not
argue that the damaging consequences for the EU would be enough to, say, dis-
mantle it, but only that they might contribute to its weakening. The argument
advanced in this article rather indicated that if, however, the EU fails to compen-
sate or correct for these damaging consequences through additional means, their
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impact could be greater. The approach is, in this sense, more evaluative than pre-
scriptive. However, we still have two reasons to think that the argument advanced
in this article can actually be stronger in the normative sense than initially
suggested.2 One of them is that, depending on the context, perhaps the most effi-
cient way of preventing the damaging consequences of a piece of legislation is
not by correcting or balancing them with additional regulations, but by modifying
or removing the piece of legislation that creates the need for remedial action. The
other reason, more specifically related to the regulation of aid challenged in this
article, is that its decontextualization from a large and robust body of laws and
conjuncture might actually minimize its consequences instead of overrating them.
This is because, although there are laws and policies aimed at improving integra-
tion between immigrants and citizens in Europe, there are also several laws and
policies aiming at (administratively) criminalizing immigration in itself. It could
then be the case that, if the politics of criminalizing solidarity operates synergisti-
cally with the latter, even if it opposes the former, the negative consequences
identified in this article could actually be normatively stronger than argued or
expected.
5. Conclusion
The aftermath of what became known as the European refugee crisis can be said
to have sparked a crisis of solidarity in Europe, having introduced a gap between
the motivation of non-state actors to help and its enforcement at the state and
supra-state levels. Although many demonstrations of solidarity with refugees and
asylum seekers were made by EU citizens and residents, alongside humanitarian
organizations, what they saw as an exercise of their duty to help other human
beings was transformed into something illegal. EU regulations and the Member
States’ policies were tightened to ban such solidarity. Saving people from drown-
ing in the Mediterranean Sea, giving them shelter or a lift, or simply distributing
food and water at detention centres or refugee camps became a crime in certain
circumstances. As a result, individuals accused of human smuggling, facilitation
of illegal immigration and trespassing, among other things, have been arrested,
prosecuted and fined. Moreover, the work of humanitarian organizations has been
curtailed and closely monitored.
The critical term that emerged among migration supporters and activists to refer
to this conjuncture was “criminalization of solidarity”. In order to include this term
in the academic debate, this article started by disclosing the embedded claims pre-
sent in the rhetorical usage of the term. The term “criminalization of solidarity”
2 I thank an anonymous reviewer for these suggestions.
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was seen as incorporating a critique of the criminalization of humanitarian assis-
tance, as well as its impact on the underlying morality of the people. The
term proposed for referring to these aggregated critiques was “the politics of
criminalizing solidarity”. The article then scrutinized the design of the politics of
criminalizing solidarity and its consequences. It was argued that at least three
aspects of the politics of criminalizing solidarity – the blending aspect, the moral
aspect and the polarizing aspect – plausibly indicate the possibility that regulating
the aid in question will produce consequences for the EU that are not only
unintended, but also damaging.
The effects that these three aspects supposedly produce in order to make the
politics of criminalizing solidarity achieve its goal of reducing illegal immigration
are the same ones capable of producing unintended and damaging consequences
for the EU. Therefore this article called for a more careful evaluation of this strat-
egy. By way of analogy, for summarising the rationale of the argument, we can
think of a situation where someone obtains a gun to protect himself against theft.
This person might have managed, with the help of the gun, to scare away some
suspicious people that he believes would otherwise have stolen his wallet, but
ended up shooting his own foot instead. In addition to the pain and the costs of
treating the injury, this would have made him unable to work for some time and
he would have ended up losing more money than he had in his wallet when the
suspicious people approached him. This accident could have been avoided with
better planning and by having a better overview of the possible consequences
beyond the intended one. If, despite his mistake, he is adequately supported by a
well-functioning system that provides him with healthcare straight away, he will
suffer less damage than would otherwise be the case. If, on the other hand, he is
not the only one failing to plan properly and, for instance, the hospital has failed
to account for the number of emergencies, thus delaying his treatment, then the
damaging consequences will probably have an even worse impact.
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